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Introduction
This paper investigates patterns in discretionary spending by state governments over the business cycle. 1 Discretionary spending encompasses the main components of state budgets that do not behave as automatic stabilizers. It includes spending on infrastructure and capital equipment, the financing of government service provision, and transfers to local governments (e.g., for education). In response to economic downturns, discretionary spending does not automatically fall like own-source revenues or rise like payouts through unemployment insurance and low-income entitlement programs. Instead, the level of discretionary spending is set by the annual 1 A moderate degree of pro-cyclicality in total and capital spending has previously been documented in work by Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha (2001) and Fatás and Mihov (2006) , but the distinction between discretionary spending and mandatory entitlement programs does not appear to have been pursued.
(or, in some states, biennial) appropriations choices of state legislatures. Given the behavior of automatic stabilizers, balanced budget requirements will constrain this spending to move pro-cyclically unless states save significantly during economic expansions. 2 I find that discretionary spending exhibits a high degree of pro-cyclicality. On average across U.S. states from 1960 to 2006, a $1 deviation in income from trend predicts an 8 cent deviation in discretionary spending from trend. These fluctuations imply a spending elasticity of -0.8 with respect to the size of a state's economy.
As noted in previous work (Clemens and Miran, 2012) , it is difficult to rationalize this pro-cyclical spending on infrastructure, equipment, and service provision as serving a welfare-enhancing purpose. The consumption of public services, for example, would generate greater utility if these services flowed smoothly. Similarly, if capital expenditures must be conducted with any cyclical orientation at all, they would ideally be reserved for downturns as a source of "shovel ready" projects. Infrastructure and equipment will also tend to be more expensive during booms, when construction wages and prices more generally will be high due to high demand, than during recessions. 3 My analysis focuses on the predictors of cross-state differences in three features of states' discretionary spending: the degree of its pro-cyclicality, the pace of adjustments at the beginning of downturns, and the composition of the adjustments at both the beginnings of downturns and over the full course of the business cycle. I show first that pro-cyclicality is a significant feature of nearly all major technical (e.g, capital, current, and intergovernmental) and functional (e.g., education, health, and transportation) categories of spending. Spending on health, which can in practice be closely tied to safety-net spending, is a notable exception. Spending in all other categories adjusts roughly in proportion to the size of the economy; the elasticity of spending with respect to the size of a state's economy tends to be close to 1. 4 I next identify two empirically important predictors of volatility in discretionary spending. Tax revenues exhibit greater pro-cyclicality than other state government revenue sources, with the personal income tax exhibiting greater volatility than other forms of tax revenue (Follette, Kusko, and Lutz, 2009) . I show that reliance on relatively volatile revenue sources translates into greater pro-cyclicality in discretionary spending. 5 This result holds strongly for capital, current, and intergovernmental expenditures and has significant economic implications. The estimates imply that states in the first quartile of reliance on taxation have discretionary spending that is half as volatile as those in the top quartile. 4 The parameter estimated is similar in spirit to the "policy elasticity" parameter estimated in two papers by Fatas and Mihov (Fatás and Mihov, 2003, 2006) , who study fiscal policy both across countries and across US states.
5 Over a sample extending from 1978 to 1994, Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha (2001) found relatively little evidence that differences in states' tax bases predicted differences in the cyclicality of total state spending. Their exercise difference from the exercise conducted here in several ways: it covered a briefer sample period, focused on total state spending rather than discretionary spending, and focused on differences in the composition of states' tax revenues rather than on tax revenues as a share of total state revenues.
The length of state budgetary cycles emerges as a predictor of the volatility of discretionary capital spending. Capital expenditures exhibit almost no cyclicality in states with both biennial budgetary and biennial legislative cycles. In other states, capital expenditures exhibit even greater volatility than other categories of spending.
Longer budgetary and legislative cycles may help states smooth their infrastructure investments and equipment purchases. State differences in a second fiscal institution of interest, namely the stringency of their balanced budget requirements, has little power for predicting the pro-cyclicality of spending over the full course of the business cycle.
I next move to an investigation of the mid-year budget cuts made by states at the beginnings of recessions. Poterba (1994) shows that, consistent with compliance with their strict balanced budget requirements, states with restrictions on the maintenance (i.e., the "carrying over") of short-term, general obligation debt enact substantial mid-year budget cuts (or budgetary rescissions) in the face of unexpected fiscal shocks. Clemens and Miran (2012) I begin this phase of the analysis by estimating the extent to which claimed budget cuts translate into reductions in observed levels of spending. While states do, on average, appear to enact cuts as claimed, the estimated relationship between budget cuts and total discretionary spending lacks precision. The lack of power likely reflects the moderate size of the relevant fiscal shocks and measurement error inherent in their construction. It may also reflect significant variation in the extent to which states reduce their budgets as claimed.
I then investigate the composition of the realized reductions in spending. Realized cuts are disproportionately concentrated in categories that are relatively deferrable (e.g., capital expenditures and spending in categories like Utilities, which is dominated by spending associated with the maintenance of public transit systems, power plants, and water infrastructure). Conditional on having to make mid-year rescissions, states attempt to limit disruptions to the flow of public services.
Finally, I investigate the extent to which interest groups influence different aspects of the budget cutting process. I find evidence that when relatively strong publicsector unions are associated with a category of spending, that category largely avoids mid-year budgetary rescissions. 6 I find no evidence that strong unions reduce the total quantity of budget cuts enacted. Rather, the relative strength of union groups drives the distribution of a fixed quantity of rescissions. Avoided mid-year rescissions do not extend into the next year's appropriations cycle. At the beginnings of recessions, unions thus appear to exert more significant influence over mid-year budget cuts (which take place outside of the usual appropriations process) than over appropriations. The results are suggestive regarding the relative influence of unions over governors (who play significant roles in the process of allocating rescissions) and legislatures.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I investigate the degree of spending pro-cyclicality across states and budgetary categories from 1960 to 2006.
In section 3 I present a strategy for investigating the composition of the mid-year rescissions induced by strict balanced budget requirements. In section 4 I describe the data used to construct the variables of interest for this portion of the analysis. In section 5 I present the results and in section 6 I conclude.
The Cyclicality of Discretionary Spending
In this section I examine the relationship between de-trended, state-level personal income and discretionary spending by state governments. The personal income data come from the Regional Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), while the spending data come from the Census Bureau's Annual Survey of State Government Finances (ASSGF). After converting all series into real dollars per capita, I take residuals from regressions of the following form:
(1) 
as well as regressions of the form
with j = 1, 2, or 3. β 1 is an estimate of the extent to which discretionary spending takes a pro-cyclical stance over the full course of the business cycle. Estimates of γ j reveal the timing with which spending responds to changes in income. Estimates using levels provide a sense for the absolute size of states' cyclical adjustments. Estimates using logs provide evidence regarding the elasticity of expenditures with respect to the size of the economy.
Figures 1 and 2 provide graphical evidence, previously reported by Clemens and Miran (2012) , on the cyclicality of states' discretionary spending. Both figures involve residuals from estimates of equation (1) and safety-net programs on a per capita basis. Detrending was conducted using state-specific quartic polynomials. Personal income data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and state government spending data come from the Census of Governments (COG). This figure was originally published in Clemens and Miran (2012) .
that when personal income is $1 below trend, discretionary spending tends to be 7.8 cents below trend (with a standard error of 1.7 cents). These fluctuations imply a spending elasticity of -0.8 with respect to the size of a state's economy. The figure plots state-year observations of de-trended personal income and state government spending outside of insurance trusts and safety-net programs on a per capita basis. The best-fit line has a slope of 0.078 (standard error of 0.017). Detrending was conducted using state-specific quartic polynomials. Personal income data come from the BEA and state government spending data come from the COG. This figure was originally published in Clemens and Miran (2012 Although adjustments in capital spending do not take place as rapidly as adjustments in other categories, capital spending emerges as having the most pro-cyclical stance over the full course of the business cycle. Consistent with this finding, capitalintensive spending on highways exhibits greater pro-cyclicality than other functional categories.
7 The presentation of one and three year differences allows for comparison with results presented by Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha (2001) . Estimates regarding the cyclicality of capital expenditures are some of the only directly comparable results, and the results are quite similar (see Sorenson, Wu and Yosha's Table 7 ). The significant difference between our estimates for the cyclicality of total expenditures reflects my focus on spending outside of mandatory entitlement programs, which fluctuate counter-cyclically. Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively. Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in parentheses beneath each point estimate. Each cell contains the result from a separate regression. The sample includes all states but Alaska for the years 1960-2006. The detrended variables ε G s,t and ε I s,t are constructed analogously, where ε G s,t is constructed as the residual of government spending (in a particular category) in state s and year t from a regression that predicts spending using state-specific quartic trends. The fiscal variables are as described in the note to Table 1 and the text. The de-trended variables were expressed in real per capita terms prior to de-trending for the specifications presented in Panel A. The variables were additionally expressed in logs prior to de-trending for the results in Panel B.
Tables 3 and 4 explore the extent to which differences in states' fiscal institutions predict differences in the cyclicality of their discretionary spending. Table 3 focuses on the relationship between cyclicality and the use of taxation as a source of revenue. Tax revenues are more volatile than other sources of state government revenue, which are dominated by intergovernmental revenues, a variety of charges (including student tuition payments) and user fees, and revenues generated from states' natural resources. Among the important sources of state tax revenue, personal income taxes are more volatile than sales taxes. The results in Tables 3 involve estimates of the following forms:
and
where for each state s, the tax share variable is calculated as 
Subtraction of the global mean allows the coefficient β 1 to be interpreted as an estimate of the degree of cyclicality for a state with the mean level of reliance on taxation.
When constructed using all taxes as a share of revenue, TaxShare s has a mean of 0.0 and a standard deviation of 0.06. When constructed using personal income taxes as a share of revenue, it has a mean of 0.0 and a standard deviation of 0.08. Table 2 . The tax share variable for each state is constructed by first taking the mean of tax revenues as a share of total revenues for the full sample, then subtracting the global mean of the tax share for all states. The subtraction of the global mean yields tax share variables with means of 0. The total tax share variable has a standard deviation of roughly 0.06 while the income tax share variable has a standard deviation of roughly 0.08. The table presents three sets of regressions, each involving two rows of coefficients, one for the main effect of the relevant income variable and the other containing an interaction between the income variable and the tax share variable.
State reliance on taxation strongly predicts the degree of pro-cyclicality in discretionary spending. The magnitude of the differences in cyclicality across high and low tax states is substantial. Estimates of equations (4) and (5) appear in Table 3 .
They imply that states in the first quartile of reliance on taxation tend to have spending about half as volatile as those in the top quartile. At the extremes, states at the bottom of the tax-reliance distribution exhibit one sixth of the cyclicality of the most tax-reliant states. These differences in the cyclicality of expenditures almost perfectly match the associated differences in the cyclicality of revenues across states (results not shown). The relatively severe pro-cyclicality of spending in tax-reliant states pervades across capital, current, and intergovernmental expenditures. 8
Results in Table 4 expand on equations (4) and (5) by allowing two measures of states' fiscal institutions to mediate the cyclicality of state expenditures (in addition to reliance on taxation). The first fiscal institution is the length of the budgetary cycle.
While a slim majority of states budget and legislate on an annual basis, others do so once every two years. Some states budget biennially while legislating annually and others both legislate and budget on two year cycles (Snell, 2010) . The specifications reported in Table 4 include an interaction between deviations in income from trend and an indicator for states that both budget and legislate biennially. 9 States also vary 8 One implication of this finding relates to the tendency of taxation to be more progressive than alternative sources of revenue. Progressive taxation provides a form of social insurance at a point in time. When states fail to save for recessions, however, it also results in relatively severe fiscal stress, requiring cuts to discretionary programs. If these cuts extend to the social safety net, the choice of revenue instruments may involve a trade-off between point-in-time progressivity and the performance of social insurance programs over the course of the business cycle.
9 States that budget biennially and legislate annually ultimately exhibit the same cyclical patterns as states the budget on an annual basis (results not shown). The frequency of state budgeting and legislative sessions is not constant over time. I acquired information on changes in these frequen- in terms of the stringency of their balanced budget requirements. The specifications in Table 4 include an interaction between deviations in income from trend and an indicator for states with relatively weak budget rules. I hold off on a detailed explanation of the budget rule variable until the following sections, where these rules take center stage.
The results show that reliance on taxation is far more predictive of the cyclicality of discretionary spending than the fiscal institutions. Biennial budgeting emerges as an important predictor of the cyclicality of capital, but not other, expenditures. States that budget and legislate biennially have a-cyclical capital expenditures while states that either budget or legislate annually exhibit substantial pro-cyclicality. Smooth budgeting of capital projects thus appears to be facilitated by budgeting over a relatively long time horizon.
Budget rules do not strongly predict the cyclicality of spending over the full course of the business cycle. The next section shows that budget rules do play a role in shaping how fast states respond to the unexpected shocks that occur at the beginnings of recessions. The results in Table 4 are driven by the fact that states with weak budget rules also expose themselves to large shocks through extensive reliance on personal income taxation. 10 cies from Snell (2010) , which is available through the website for the National Conference of State Legislators: http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12658.
Estimating the Composition of Mid-Year Rescissions
The previous section focused on the adjustments made by states over the full course of the business cycle. In this section my focus shifts towards the budget cuts made by states at the beginnings of economic downturns. The analysis decomposes the mid-year budget cuts made by states with relatively strict balanced budget requirements when they are faced with unexpected fiscal shocks. An interesting feature of these budget cuts is that they take place outside of the normal appropriations process. While state legislatures dominate the normal appropriations process, state governors take a leading role in shaping mid-year rescissions in response to revenue shortfalls (Snell, 2010 When states experience adverse fiscal shocks, they respond by enacting mid-year budget cuts and tax increases. States with strict balanced budget requirements (to be defined in detail in the following section) enact significantly more rescissions than other states (Poterba, 1994; Clemens and Miran, 2012) . I investigate the extent to which this rule-induced differential in rescissions translates into observably lower levels of expenditures, with further analysis of the composition of the cuts that are made. This translates into the two-stage estimation strategy outlined below: 13 12 The use of constant-law measures is crucial because mid-year adjustments to outlays and revenues will tend to undo the appearance of fiscal shocks. Were mid-year adjustments to be complete, for example, realized deficits would always equal zero when states enter the fiscal year expecting the budget to balance. 13 Poterba clarifies an important point regarding what might look like a simultaneity problem in the first-stage regressions due to the appearance of △Outlays s,t in the construction of the deficit shock (1994, pp. 809-810) . In fact, a true simultaneity problem would result from failing to subtract △Outlays s,t . As Poterba notes, if one did not subtract △Outlays s,t , the resulting measure of the shock would equal the true measure of the shock plus △Outlays s,t . Hence regressing △Outlays s,t on this incorrect measure would amount to regressing it on itself plus a random variable. Subtracting △Outlays s,t yields an estimate of the true shock and eliminates the simultaneity problem. That said, it should be noted that classical measurement error in △Outlays s,t would tend to bias the coefficient on the deficit shock towards 1 under these circumstances rather than towards 0 as in the usual case. 
Since the budget rules only bind when deficit shocks are positive (i.e., adverse), Table 6 .
tion: in a given spending category G, there are γ 1 cents in budget cuts for each total dollar in reported mid-year rescissions.
After investigating the composition of budget cuts across the full set of states in the sample, I expand the specification to investigate the possibility that public-sector unions drive variation in the composition of budget cuts across states. I do this through a straightforward modification to the specification described by equations (7) and (8). The modification involves interacting the deficit shock variables (both the main effects and the interactions with the indicator for weak budget rules) and △Outlays s,t with an indicator for the presence of a strong union associated with a particular spending category. These specifications involve two first-stage regressions, one for predicting the main effect of △Outlays s,t and the second for predicting the interaction between △Outlays s,t and the union indicator. I describe the construction of the union variable in the following section.
Data
The binding constraint for constructing the measure of deficit shocks is the availability of data on mid-year rescissions and tax increases, which begins in 1988. I have constructed these shocks for the years 1988 through 2004. Several state-year observations are missing due to unreported or otherwise problematic data on one of the inputs required for constructing the shocks.
The sample of states builds up from the base of 27 annually budgeting states used by Poterba (1994 Table 5 .
Budget Rules
State balanced budget requirements play a central role in the estimation frame-
work. 16 I collect information on balanced budget requirements from a 1987 report by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and from various reports by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). Rules
can be differentiated in large part on the basis of whether they affect the enactment or execution of a state's budget. An example of a rule that applies to the budget's enactment is a rule requiring the legislature to pass a balanced budget. Such a rule does not force states to respond quickly to deficits that emerge over the course of the fiscal year. It requires only that the budget be balanced (in expectation) in the following fiscal year, i.e., that E(G t + 1) ≤ E(T t + 1). Stricter rules apply more directly to the execution of the budget. The strictest rule (also known as the "No-Carry" rule) prohibits carrying deficits through the next budget cycle. This rule requires that if Tables 6 through 10 . This sample builds from the sample of 27 annually budgeting states analyzed by Poterba (1994) and by Clemens and Miran (2011) by adding the 13 states that operate with biennial budgetary cycles and annual legislative cycles. States were coded according to a stringency index found in Table 3 of ACIR (1987) . States with an index value < 7 are classified as weak >= 7 as strong. The index value of 7 is the threshold separating states that do and do not allow deficits from previous fiscal years to be carrier through the current fiscal year (i.e., the no carry over rule).
a deficit is incurred at time t, the budget for the following year must be such that
De f icit t + E(G t + 1) ≤ E(T t + 1). 17
I generate the measure of budget rules using a 1 to 10 index produced by the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (1987). I designate the 11 states with scores less than 7 as "weak-rule" states. This is the cutoff associated with the 17 Past research has explored some of the consequences of these rules. Notable studies include work by Poterba (1997) and Bohn and Inman (1996) , who examine the impact of different requirements on a broad range of budgetary outcomes. Highlights also include Poterba and Rueben (2001) and Lowry (2001) , whose work addresses the nexus between balanced budget requirements, state fiscal behavior, and interest rates on general-obligation debt. These studies confirm empirically that requirements which apply to the budget's execution have greater impact than those that apply only to the budget's enactment. Strict budget rules are associated with lower spending levels, modestly greater accumulation of surpluses in budget stabilization funds, and faster adjustment in response to fiscal shocks.
relatively crucial distinction between states with and without a rule that approximates the No-Carry rule. 18 Table 5 categorizes the 40 states in the sample by their classification as having weak or strong budget rules.
Deficit Shocks
The construction of the measure of deficit shocks was described in the previous section. Here I present evidence similar to that presented by Clemens and Miran (2012) , but for a larger sample of states, regarding the timing of deficit shocks with respect to the business cycle. 18 In addition to the ACIR and NASBO classifications of budget rules, a classification can also be found in a 1993 report by GAO. Differences between these classification systems are the subject of an exchange between Levinson and Krol and Svorny (Levinson, 1998; Krol and Svorny, 2007; Levinson, 2007) . An alternative classification scheme, based on direct readings of statutes and constitutions across states, has also been recently produced by Hou and Smith (2006) . The literature points towards the notion that state political culture may ultimately be as important as the actual content of the requirements themselves Hou and Smith (2006) . We focus on the ACIR classification system because of its power for predicting state's mid-year budget cuts. This is another case in which we would devote more time and space to robustness analysis if we were ultimately pushing a particular estimate of the multiplier on state government spending. Given that we have not settled on an estimate of the multiplier, however, we note only that robustness analyses along these lines, coupled with a compelling justification for the baseline specification, are crucial components of analyses that rely on particular schemes for classifying budget rules. 
Measures of Public-Sector Worker Organizations
My measure of public-sector worker organizations uses the 1987 Census of Governments. Unfortunately, the Census of Governments stopped collecting information on the extent of worker organizations after 1987. Nonetheless, the 1987 data provide a baseline look at these organizations in the year immediately before the sample begins. I begin by constructing the fraction of full time workers in each category who are reported as being organized. Table 6 presents summary statistics for these worker-organization rates. The means range from 32% for Education to 55% for Highways and the distributions reveal significant variation within each functional category across states. Note that since direct state spending on education primarily involves higher education, the relevant education workers are university employees rather than elementary and secondary teachers and administrators. Highway workers include workers involved in road maintenance (including, e.g., snow and ice removal), toll booth workers, and operators of bridges and ferries). The "Other" category is dominated by government administration and workers involved with mass transit, which the census considers a utility rather than a component of highway/transportation spending.
Worker-organization rates tend to correlate highly across groups within states, with the exception of the residual "Other" category. In results not shown I found that absolute rates of unionization do not affect the total quantity of cuts from state budgets in the face of fiscal shocks. The presented analysis thus focuses on the effect of relative rates of public worker organization (within a state) on the composition of the budget cuts enacted. The analysis involves a binary indicator of strong union status, which I construct as follows. For each category of workers, I calculate the fraction of workers organized in their "own" category and in "all other" categories.
I then rank states on the basis of the difference between these "own" and "all other"
fractions. Finally, I categorize the top half of states according to this (relative) measure as having a strong union associated with the spending category in question.
The measure is constructed such that a) half of the states are categorized as having a Table 5 . The selection of years is driven by results presented in Table 7 and discussed in the text. The ∆OUTLAYS variable contains the mid-year budgetary rescissions reported by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). The DEFSHOCK variables are constructed using information on budget forecasts, state budget realizations, mid-year rescissions, and mid-year tax changes, with the final variable constructed as described in the text. All of these data are taken from semi-annual reports by NASBO. State spending across categories is defined as reported in Table 1 with one exception: the Other category from Table 1 has been divided into Law Enforcement and Other, with Utilities also being broken out of the Other category for purposes of the analysis repoted in Table 8 . Information on unionization rates for public sector workers comes from the 1987 Census of Governments. Law Enforcement consists primarily of the corrections budget. Utilities include publicly own electric, gas, and water facilities and infrastructure as well as publicly owned mass transit systems.
(relatively) strong union for each spending category, and b) each state is categorized as having a strong union in 2 or 3 of the 5 spending categories.
Description of Fiscal Variables
The first section of Table 6 Census of Governments. These are direct expenditures by state governments and do not include intergovernmental grants from state governments to local governments.
Consequently, the Education category, which accounts for the largest share of nonwelfare spending (slightly more than 1/3), primarily reflects spending on institutions of higher education as opposed to elementary and secondary education. Additionally, the Health category does not include payments related to Medicaid, which are categorized as public welfare expenditures. The measurement of deficit shocks may also be more error prone during expansionary years due to the absence of reporting on mid-year spending increases. 20 For some combination of these reasons, the budget rules lack predictive power during the expansionary period. Consequently, I focus solely on the periods of fiscal stress in my effort to decompose these cuts across budgetary categories. Most of the spec- Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively. Standard errors, calculated allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in parentheses beneath each point estimate. In all columns, the sample contains the 40 states listed and classified as in Table 5 ifications presented below use the specification in column 4 as their first stage. In column 4 the two periods of fiscal stress are simply stacked together. This is done fairly literally in the sense that, to assist with second-stage precision (which is generally in short supply), separate sets of state fixed effects and trends are included for each period of fiscal stress. 21 Table 8 presents relatively detailed breakdowns of the impact of mid-year rescissions on spending across categories. All entries in the table correspond to point estimates and standard errors for γ 1 the coefficient on △Outlays from equation (7).
Results

First Stage Regressions
Second Stage Results
In the first row I explore the distribution of budget cuts across the technical spending categories, where the sum of the non welfare current and capital expenditures in columns 2 and 3 add to the aggregate of non welfare current and capital expen- In rows 2 and 3, I break discretionary spending into its functional categories.
Rescissions appear across the board, with a disproportionately small share falling on Education and a disproportionately large share falling on the residual Other category. When I break this residual down into Utilities and Non-Utilities (primarily governmental administration), it becomes apparent that Utilities, in particular, bear a disproportionately large share of rescissions.
The results suggest that, in general, spending categories associated with lumpy, Table   7 , then scaled them so that a coefficient of 1 would correspond to a rescission exactly in proportion to a category's share of the total. I then plotted each category's scaled γ 1 against its coefficient of variation (CV), which I calculated within states I also investigate the importance of public-sector union groups. In specifications similar to the standard first-stage specifications, I find no evidence that the presence of strong unions reduces the total quantity of rescissions enacted per dollar of deficit shock (results not shown). The specifications presented below investigate the effects of differences in the relative strength of the union groups within a state. Having found that unions exert no impact on the quantity of rescissions, I investigate their impact on the composition of the cuts enacted. The relative strength of the publicsector worker organizations appears to be a significant determinant of cross-state variation in the composition of mid-year rescissions.
I first present the union results in Table 9 on a category-by-category basis. Since I only have cross-sectional variation in the relative strength of public-sector unions, the category-by-category analysis amounts to dividing states along union-strength lines in addition to along budget-rule lines. This leaves a fairly small number of states in each cell. Across all 5 spending categories, the results suggest that smaller rescissions take place when the relevant worker group is relatively strong. While consistent across the categories, however, the results are not statistically strong in any one case. This pushes me towards specifications that stack the categories, yielding observations at the state-by-category-by-year level. These specifications more fully utilize the available variation in worker organizations, which occurs at the state-bycategory level. for the first stage on △Outlays and on the interaction between the union indicator and △Outlays. In these columns I include the instruments involving both the positive and negative deficit shock variables. I drop the negative deficit shock instruments in Columns 5 and 6. Dropping these instruments leads the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald Statistic to increase from 4.41 to 8.34. This exceeds standard weak instrument thresholds for tests of distortion to the size of the estimated confidence intervals in the case of two endogenous regressors and two instruments. Results from Stock and Yogo (2002) imply that the specifications should be run using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) to confirm that estimation using Two Stage Least Table 8 , the sample corresponds to the sample whose summary statistics were presented in Table 6 and that was used in the first stage regression reported in column 4 of Table 7 . The excluded instruments are the interactions between a weak-budget-rules indicator and the two DEFSHOCK variables as well as interactions between the weak-budget-rules indicator, the two DEFSHOCK variables, and the relevant indicator for the presence of a strong public sector worker union. The main effect of ∆OUTLAYS and the interaction between ∆OUTLAYS and the union indicator are both treated as endogenous variables. The specification thus involves separate first stage regressions for generating predicted values of each of these variables. The main effects of the two DEFSHOCK variables, as well as interactions between the two DEFSHOCK variables and the relevant indicator for the presence of the strong union were also included as controls. The dependent variables are the real per capita spending quantities of the categories named at the top of each column. These variables were constructed using data from the ASSGF as previously described. The strong union indicators were constructed using data on public sector worker organization from the 1987 Census of Governments. A state is said to have a strong union for a particular category of spending when the fraction of workers relevant to that category is large relative to the fraction of workers unionized in other categories.
Squares (2SLS) does not result in downwardly biased standard errors.
Second stage estimates of the effect of strong unions on budget cuts appear in columns 3,4, 7 and 8. The specifications in columns 3 and 4 are, respectively, 2SLS
and LIML specifications which take columns 1 and 2 as their first stages. The specifications in columns 7 and 8 are 2SLS and LIML specifications which take columns 5 and 6 as their first stages. The stacked results confirm what was observed in Table   8 . Most mid-year budgetary rescissions occur in categories associated with relatively weak public-sector worker organizations. Neither the point estimates nor the standard errors are affected by the various specification changes.
In results not shown, estimates suggest that the differential cuts associated with weakly unionized workers occur primarily in the capital component of each category's budget. Mid-year budget cuts do not appear to have significant effects on public-sector wages. As shown earlier in Table 6 , capital expenditures bear a disproportionate share of mid-year cuts, consistent with capital expenditures being the most readily deferrable or reducible expenditures on relatively short notice.
Other results not shown suggest relatively strong effects of public-sector unions "own" and "all other" worker categories.
The union result fades out in the subsequent fiscal year. While the results are insufficiently precise to draw strong conclusions, this is consistent with public unions having differential influence over the allocation of mid-year rescissions to already enacted budgets than over spending as determined in the subsequent appropriations cycle. In many states, the governor is authorized to dictate rescissions unilaterally when revenues come in lower than projected. Appropriations, on the other hand, must be approved by state legislatures. The results are thus consistent with models in which interest groups can more effectively lobby in the face of a single, executive actor than in the face of relatively dispersed power as under a legislature.
Conclusion
The above analysis draws out a variety of facts regarding the behavior of state governments over the course of the business cycle. Economic downturns are associated with reductions in discretionary spending on infrastructure, education, other state government services, and transfers to local governments. These fluctuations tend to be most severe in states that utilize relatively volatile revenue bases and budget over relatively brief windows.
Pro-cyclical spending reflects the reality of complying with balanced budget requirements during recessions after failing to save during expansions. Confronted with the need to make cuts, states appear to proceed so as to limit disruptions to public-service provision. This was reflected in the disproportionate share of cuts borne by capital expenditures and by budgetary categories that are likely to contain deferrable projects. Finally, I find evidence that interest groups can play an influential role in the budget-cutting process; public-sector unions, in particular, appear adept at avoiding mid-year rescissions.
The pro-cyclicality of discretionary spending almost certainly comes with significant costs. Conducting capital projects during expansions will cost more than conducting them during recessions (due to high wages and other input costs) and may contribute to the severity of the business cycle. Cyclical spending also implies service flows that are more volatile than necessary. An interesting direction for future work will be to estimate the effect of these fluctuations on targeted outcomes, in particular outcomes related to safety-net programs and education. 25 Spending reductions driven by differences in the volatility of state revenue bases may be an attractive source of variation for studying the effects of these cyclical changes.
The relatively extreme volatility of spending in states that rely extensively on taxation has potentially interesting distributional implications. In these states, additional pro-cyclicality in spending comes with additional counter-cyclicality in revenue collections. On net, these countervailing forces have an ambiguous implication for the volatility of the state's economy. However, spending and tax collections can affect very different groups of people. Counter-cyclical revenue collections will most directly affect high income tax payers while volatile expenditures will most directly affect public workers and the beneficiaries of public services. Investigation of how these groups are affected by differences in the volatility to which they are exposed (e.g., in terms of their consumption over the business cycle), may be an interesting direction for future work.
A final question of interest, to the extent to which pro-cyclical spending is costly, is why states do not take more steps to avoid it. Standard explanations look to political factors (e.g., upcoming elections) that may lead politicians to discount the costs of future deficits (or volatility) in exchange for short-run political gain. The extent to which fiscal institutions mitigate or exacerbate these political tendencies has clear importance. Of equal importance, but more difficult to ascertain, are the extent to (and channels through) which such institutions influence the efficiency with which government services are produced.
